

[The following selections on the concept of time (Dus-gsum gyi rnam-bzhag), are excerpted from The Collected Topics of Rato (Rva-stod bsdus-grva), by Master Chok- hla U-ser, a great master of Rato Monastery who lived about 1500 AD. This particular book is considered the "grandfather" of what came to be a separate genre of literature in Tibet: the dura (bsdus-grva), or "selected topics from the Commentary on Valid Perception (Pramana Varttika, or Tsad-ma rnam-'grel) of Master Dharmakirti (circa 650 AD) .]

[Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.]

[Folios 101B-106B, 111A-112A]

'YANG KHA CIG NA RE, SKYES LA 'GAGS PA, 'DAS PA'I MTSAN NYID,  
SKYES LA MA 'GAGS PA, DA LTAR BA'I MTSAN NYID, SKYES PA'I RGYU  
YOD KYANG MA SKYES PA'I CHA, MA 'ONGS PA'I MTSAN NYID,

Suppose someone comes again, and makes the following claim:

The definition of the past is: "That which has begun and stopped."  
The definition of the present is: "That which has begun and not yet stopped." The definition of the future is: "That condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for beginning are present."

MTSAN GZHI RIM PA LTAR, NA NING GI LO TOG, DANG PO'I MTSAN  
GZHI, DA LO'I LO TOG ,GNYIS PA'I MTSAN GZHI, DO ZHAG GI LO TOG,  
GSUM PA'I MTSAN GZHI ZER NA,

Respective examples would be the following. For the first, the example would be last year's crops. For the second, it would be this year's crops; and, for the third, crops soon to grow.

DANG PO LA, 'DAS PA'I MTSAN NYID DANG MTSAN GZHI DE MI 'THAD  
PAR THAL, 'DAS PA'I MTSAN NYID MED PA'I PHYIR TE, 'DAS PA MED PA'I  
PHYIR TE, GZHI GRUB NA, DA LTAR BA YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

Concerning the first of these, we answer as follows.

Aren't your definition and example for the past though incorrect?

Because there is no definition for the past,  
And this is because the past doesn't even exist,  
And this is because anything which can be established as existing is always  
something of the present.

BYAS PA LA KHO NA RE, 'DAS PA YOD PAR THAL, 'DAS PA'I DUS YOD  
PA'I PHYIR TE, 'DAS PA'I DUS DANG , MA 'ONGS PA'I DUS DANG , DA  
LTAR BA'I DUS GSUM YOD PA'I PHYIR TE, DUS GSUM YOD PA'I PHYIR NA,  
MA KHYAB,

On this point, someone may come and make the following claim:

But there must be things that are past,  
Because past time exists;  
And this is because all three—past time, and future time, and  
present time—exist.  
And this is because the three times exist.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

'O NA, KHO RANG LA, 'DAS PA 'DAS PA YIN PAR THAL, 'DAS PA YOD PA'I  
PHYIR, RTAGS KHAS,

And we also ask this person,

So is the past the past?  
Because the past exists.

You already agreed to the reason here.

'DOD NA, 'DAS PA CHOS CAN, 'DAS PA MA YIN PAR THAL, 'GAGS PA MA  
YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, ZHIG PA MA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: the past is the past.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the past.  
It is not so the past,  
Because it is not something which has stopped;

And this is true because it is not something which has been destroyed.

KHYAB STE, 'DAS PA 'GAGS PA ZHIG PA GSUM DON GCIG YIN PA'I PHYIR  
TE, DE GSUM KA YOD PA'I PHYIR TE, 'DAS PA YOD PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS  
KHAS,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because "the past," "that which has stopped," and "that which has been  
destroyed" all refer to the same thing.

And this is true because all three of them exist;

And this is true because the past exists.

You already agreed that the reason is true.

MA KHYAB 'TSAMS LA MA GRUB NA, 'DAS PA CHOS CAN, ZHIG PA MA  
YIN PAR THAL, DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Suppose that, instead of "it doesn't necessarily follow," the opponent says "it's  
incorrect."

Consider the past.

It is not so something which has been destroyed,

Because it is a working thing.

KHYAB STE, ZHIG PA DANG DNGOS PO'I GZHI MTHUN MED PA'I PHYIR  
TE, LEGS BSHAD GSER GYI 'PHRENG BA LAS, RANG BZHIN GYIS GRUB  
PAR 'DZIN PA'I PHYOGS THAMS CAD LA, ZHIG PA DNGOS POR NI MI  
BZHED LA, ZHES GSUNGS PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because there exists no one thing which is both (1) something that has been  
destroyed but which is still (2) a working thing.

And this is true because the *Golden Necklace of Good Explanation* says,

None of the schools that belong to the side that believe that things  
exist through some nature of their own accept the idea that

something which has been destroyed could be a working thing.

[The Golden Necklace *is a famed commentary by Je Tsongkapa upon the Ornament of Realizations, spoken to the realized being Asanga by Lord Maitreya.*]

SNGA MA LA MA GRUB NA, 'DAS PA CHOS CAN, DNGOS PO YIN PAR THAL, BYAS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I disagree to your earlier statement.]

Suppose you say that the earlier one is not correct.

Consider the past.  
It is so a working thing,  
Because it is something made.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, 'DER THAL, SKYES PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the past is something made.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.  
It is so,  
Because it's something that started.

KHYAB STE, SKYES PA BYAS PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,  
Because "something that started" is the definition of "something made."

SNGA MAR MA GRUB NA, 'DAS PA CHOS CAN, SKYES PA YIN PAR THAL,  
SKYES LA 'GAGS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, 'DAS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[The earlier point is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the earlier point is not correct.

Consider the past.  
It is so something that started,  
Because it is something that started and then stopped.  
And this is true because it's the past.

RTAGS GSAL KHAS BLANGS, KHYAB PA MTSAN NYID KYI STENG DU  
DNGOS, GZHAN YANG , ZHIG PA DNGOS PO YIN PAR THAL, 'DAS PA  
DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

You've agreed both to the reason and to what we're asserting must be so, and the  
necessity is something that does apply to the definition.

It must moreover be true that that which has been destroyed is a working thing,  
Because the past is a working thing.

RTAGS BSGRUBS ZIN, 'DOD NA, DNGOS PO ZHIG PA DNGOS PO YIN PAR  
THAL, DNGOS PO ZHIG PA YOD PA GANG ZHIG, ZHIG PA DNGOS PO YIN  
PA'I PHYIR,

We've already established that the reason is true.  
Suppose you do agree.

Is it then the case that a working thing which has been destroyed is still a  
working thing?  
Because (1) there does exist a working thing which has been destroyed, and (2)  
that which has been destroyed is a working thing.

RTAGS PHYI MA KHAS, DANG PO GRUB STE, DNGOS PO 'DAS PA YOD  
PA'I PHYIR,

You've already agreed to the latter part of the reason.

Suppose now you say that the first part is not correct.  
The first is too correct,  
Because there does exist a working thing which is past.

MA GRUB NA, DNGOS PO CHOS CAN, KHYOD 'DAS PA YOD PAR THAL,  
KHYOD 'DUS BYAS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that there does exist a working thing which is

past.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider a working thing.

There does too exist it past,

Because it is something that has been produced.

RTZA BA'I THAL 'GYUR GNYIS PA LA 'DOD NA, SHING ZHIG PA SHING  
YIN PAR THAL, DNGOS PO ZHIG PA DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS  
KHAS,

[Then I agree to your second original statement: it is the case that a  
working thing which has been destroyed is still a working  
thing.]

Suppose you agree to our second original statement.

So is a tree that was already destroyed still a tree?

Because a working thing which has been destroyed is still a working thing.

You've already accepted the reason.

'DOD NA, SHING MES TSIG GI 'OG ROL DU SHING YOD PAR THAL, SHING  
ZHIG PA SHING GANG ZHIG, SHING MES TSIG PA'I 'OG ROL DU SHING  
ZHIG PA YOD PA'I PHYIR TE, SHING MES TSIG PA'I TSE SHING ZHIG PA'I  
PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: a tree that was already  
destroyed is still a tree.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

So is it then true that when a tree has been burned up by fire there is still a tree?

Because (1) a tree that was already destroyed is a tree; and (2) there exists a  
destroyed tree subsequent to the burning up of a tree by a fire.

And this is so because—when a tree has been burned up by fire—there is a tree  
destroyed.

GONG DU 'DOD NA, SHING MES TSIG PA'I 'OG ROL DU SHING MIG SHES

KYIS MTHONG BAR THAL, DE'I 'OG ROL DU SHING YOD PA'I PHYIR,  
RTAGS KHAS,

[I agree to your statement above.]

Suppose you agree to our statement above.

Is it then the case that—subsequent to the burning up of a tree by a fire—you can  
still see a tree by using your visual consciousness?

Because there does exist a tree subsequent to that point.

You already agreed to the reason.

KHYAB PA GRUB CING , 'DOD MI NUS TE, RNAM 'GREL LAS, SKYE PHYIR  
'JIG PA 'JIG CAN 'GYUR, , DE LTAR NA 'ANG SHING MTHONG 'GYUR, ,  
ZHES PA'I GZHUNG DE ZHIG PA DNGOS POR 'DOD PA LA HA CANG  
THAL BA'I SKYON 'PHEN PA'I GZHUNG YIN PA'I PHYIR,

If the one is the case, then the other is necessarily so. [That is, if there does exist a  
tree subsequent to that point, then you must be able to see it by using your  
visual consciousness.]

And you cannot agree to this last statement;

Because the following quotation from the *Commentary on Valid Perception* was  
meant to point out—to those who asserted that something which was  
destroyed could ever be a working thing—what very absurd  
consequences their position entailed:

Because it has started, then the destruction  
Must be destroyed; and then the tree  
Would have to be seen once more.

RTZA BA'I MTSAN NYID GNYIS PA LA, SHES BYA CHOS CAN, SKYES LA  
MA 'GAGS PA YIN PAR THAL, DA LTAR BA YIN PA'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA  
KHAS,

Concerning the second of the original definitions, [that the definition of the  
present is "that which has begun and not yet stopped,"] we pose the  
following:

Consider "knowable things."  
So is it something which has begun and not yet stopped?  
Because it is something of the present.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

RTAGS GRUB STE, GZHI GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that "knowable things" is something of the present.]

It is so correct,  
Because it can be established as existing.

GONG DU 'DOD NA, SHES BYA CHOS CAN, SKYES PAR THAL, SKYES LA  
MA 'GAGS PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS KHAS,

[Then I agree to your statement above: "knowable things" is something that has begun and not yet stopped.]

Suppose you agree to our statement above.

Consider "knowable things."  
So is it something which ever began?  
Because it has begun and not yet stopped.

You already agreed to the reason.

'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, MA SKYES PAR THAL, RTAG PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,  
'DOD NA, DNGOS,

[Then I agree to your statement.]

Suppose you agree to our statement.

Consider this same thing.  
It is not so, that it is something which ever began,  
Because it is an unchanging thing.

If you agreed [that an unchanging thing could begin], then what we would answer to you is obvious.

RTZA BA'I MTSAN NYID GSUM PA LA, MA 'ONGS PA YOD PAR THAL, DE'I MTSAN NYID YOD PA'I PHYIR TE, SKYE BA'I RGYU YOD KYANG MA SKYES PA'I CHA DE, MA 'ONGS PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS KHAS,

Concerning the third of the original definitions, [that the definition of the future is: "that condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for beginning are present,"] we pose the following:

So is it true then that the future exists?

Because it is something which has a definition;

Because "that condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for beginning are present" is the definition of the future.

You already agreed that the reason was true.

GONG DU 'DOD NA, MA 'ONGS PA KHO KHO RANG YIN PAR THAL, DE YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your point above.]

Suppose you agree to the above.

So is it then the case that the future is itself?

Because it does exist.

'DOD NA, MA 'ONGS PA CHOS CAN, SKYE BA'I RGYU YOD KYANG MA SKYES PA'I CHA YIN PAR THAL, MA 'ONGS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS KHAS, KHYAB PA MTSAN NYID KYI STENG DU DNGOS,

[I agree to your statement: the future is itself.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the future.

So is it then a condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for beginning are present?

Because it is the future.

You already agreed to the reason,  
And it is obvious that the necessity must apply to the definition.

'DOD NA, RTZI DANG BYAS PAS, KHA CIG, MA 'ONGS PA, SKYE BA'I  
RGYU YOD KYANG MA SKYES PA'I CHA YIN PAR 'DOD ZER, KHA CIG,  
RTZOD GZHI CHA DE NAS SKYE BA'I RGYU YOD KYANG MA SKYES PA'I  
CHA YIN PA 'DOD ZER,

[Then I agree.]

Suppose you agree.

Depending on how they read this definition [in the Tibetan], some people claim, "I agree that the future is the condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for beginning are present (Tib: *skye ba'i rgyu yod*)." Others claim, "I agree that the object of our argument [the future] is the condition of having not yet begun, even though it has cause to begin from this same condition (Tib: *skye ba'i rgyu yod*)."

'O NA, RTZI LUGS SNGA MA LA, MA 'ONGS PA SKYE BA'I RGYU YOD PAR  
THAL, DE SKYE BA'I RGYU YOD KYANG MA SKYES PA'I CHA YIN PA'I  
PHYIR, RTAGS KHAS,

Well suppose then that you read it the first way.

So does there exist a cause that makes the future begin?  
Because the future is the condition of having not yet begun, even though the  
causes for beginning are present.

You've already accepted the reason.

'DOD NA, MA 'ONGS PA SKYE BA'I RGYU DNGOS PO YIN PAR THAL, DE  
YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[I agree that there does exist a cause that makes the future begin.]

Suppose you agree.

So is this cause that makes the future begin a working thing?  
Because it does exist.

'DOD NA, MA 'ONGS PA SKYE BA'I RGYU CHOS CAN, BYAS PA YIN PAR  
THAL, DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[I agree that it is.]

Suppose you agree.

Consider this cause that makes the future begin.  
Is it something made?  
Because it is a working thing.

'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, SKYES PA YIN PAR THAL, BYAS PA YIN PA'I  
PHYIR, RTAGS KHAS,

[I agree that it is a working thing.]

Suppose you agree.

Consider this same thing.  
Is it then something which has begun?  
Because it is something made.

You already agreed to the reason.

'DOD MI NUS TE, MA SKYES PA YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, MA SKYES PA'I CHA  
YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, YOD KYANG MA SKYES PA'I CHA YIN PA'I PHYIR,  
RTAGS GSAL KHAS BLANGS,

But you cannot agree,  
Because it is something which has not yet begun;  
Because it is the condition of having not yet begun;  
Because it is a condition where, even though [its cause] exists, it has not yet  
begun.

You've already agreed both to the reason and to what we're asserting must be so.

RTZA BA'I RTZI LUGS PHYI MA LA SKYON 'DI LTAR, SKYE BA'I RGYU

DNGOS PO YIN PAR THAL, SKYE BA'I RGYU YOD PA'I PHYIR,

And the following problem applies to the latter way of reading the phrase.

Is it then the case that this cause that will make it begin is a working thing?  
Because the cause that will make the future begin exists.

MA GRUB NA, SKYE BA'I RGYU CHOS CAN, YOD PAR THAL, YOD KYANG  
MA SKYE BA'I CHA YIN PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS GSAL KHAS,

[It's not correct to say that the cause that will make the future begin  
exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this cause that will make the future begin.  
It does so exist,  
Because [the future] is a condition where, even though [its cause exists], it has  
not yet begun.

You've already agreed both to the reason and to what we're asserting must be so.

MA KHYAB NA, RNAM BZHAG MA CHAGS SO, ,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

If you say it doesn't necessarily follow, then your whole presentation collapses.

GONG DU 'DOD NA, SKYE BA'I RGYU CHOS CAN, SKYES PAR THAL,  
DNGOS PO YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your statement above.]

Suppose you agree to our statement above.

Consider the cause that makes [the future] begin.  
It must then be something which has begun,  
Because it is a working thing.

'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, MA SKYES PAR THAL, MA SKYES PA'I CHOS YIN

PA'I PHYIR TE, MA SKYES PA'I CHA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[I agree that the cause that makes the future begin is something  
which has begun.]

Suppose you agree.

Consider then this same thing.

It is not the case that it has already begun,  
Because it is a thing which has yet to begin,  
Because it is a condition of not having yet begun.

MA GRUB NA, SKYE BA'I RGYU CHOS CAN, MA SKYES PA'I CHA YIN PAR  
THAL, YOD KYANG MA SKYES PA'I CHA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not correct to say that the cause which makes the future begin  
is a condition of not having yet begun.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this cause that makes the future begin.

It is so the condition of not having yet begun,  
Because it is the condition of having not yet begun, even though it exists.

RTAGS GSAL GNYIS KA KHAS,

You've already agreed both to the reason and to what we're asserting must be so.

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`KHA CIG GIS, SKYE BA'I RGYU YOD DAM MED ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Does there exist a cause for something to begin or not?

RANG RES YOD BYAS PA LA KHO NA RE, SKYE BA'I RGYU MED PAR  
THAL, SKYE BA MED PA'I PHYIR TE, DNGOS PO YIN NA, SKYE BA MA YIN  
PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR TE, DNGOS PO YIN NA, SKYES ZIN PAS KHYAB PA

GANG ZHIG, SKYES ZIN GYI DNGOS PO SLAR YANG BTAB STE SKYE BA MED PA'I PHYIR ZER NA,

We answer that there does, and then someone comes and makes the following claim:

But isn't it the case that no cause for something to begin exists?

Because isn't it the case that nothing beginning exists?

Because isn't it the case that, if something is a working thing, it can never be beginning?

Because (1) isn't it the case that, if something is a working thing, it must be something that began already; and (2) isn't it the case that, if a working thing has begun already, it cannot start all over again?

'DIR MA KHYAB,

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

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`YANG KHO NA RE, SKYE BA MED PAR THAL, SKYE 'GYUR DANG , SKYE DGOS DANG , SKYE KHA MA DANG , SKYE BZHIN PA RNAMS RE RE NAS MED PA'I PHYIR NA,

Suppose someone comes again and claims,

So is it then the case that there are no beginnings at all?

Because none of the following exist: "something that's going to begin," "something that needs to begin," "something that's about to begin," and "something that's in the act of beginning."

MA KHYAB PA'I LAN BTAB NAS, 'DI LTAR, SKYE BA YOD PAR THAL, SKYE BA SNGA PHYI YOD PA'I PHYIR TE, SKYE BA SNGA PHYI DU MAR TSOGS GNYIS GOMS PA YOD PA'I PHYIR TE, SKYE BA SNGA PHYI DU MAR TSOGS GNYIS GOMS PA LAS TSAD MA'I SKYES BUR 'KHRUNGS PA YOD PA'I PHYIR TE,

To this we say, "It doesn't necessarily follow," and then we say:

It's like this. The beginning or the birth of something does too exist,  
Because past and future births exist.

And this is true because there exists the practice of amassing the  
two collections over a great many births, past and future.

And this is true because there does exist the creation of an Infallible  
Being, who comes from the practice of amassing the two  
collections over a great many births, past and future.

SGRUB BYED LA LTOS TSAD YIN RIGS, ZHES PA DANG , SGRUB BYED  
THUGS RJE GOMS LAS TE, , ZHES PA RNAMS KYI DON GRUB PA'I PHYIR,

And this itself is true, because there is a point to the following two  
quotations:

By relying on the various proofs  
It's right to say "infallible."

And—

The proof is that it comes from the practice  
Of the attitude of compassion.

*[Both quotations are from the Commentary on Valid Perception, and are used to  
establish that an Enlightened Being is produced from many eons spent amassing the two  
collections.]*

GZHAN YANG , RIGS PA'I DBANG PHYUG YAB SRAS KYI LUGS DOR NAS,  
MU STEGS RGYANG PAN GYI RJES SU 'BRANG RIGS PAR THAL, TSAD MA  
LKOG GYUR DON SHES YIN, , DE SGRUB BYED KYANG MED PA'I PHYIR, ,  
NAN TAN BYED PA YOD MA YIN, , ZHES NI KHA CIG RAB TU BRJOD, ,  
ZHES PA DANG , BLO NI LUS LA BR TEN PA'I PHYIR, , GOMS PAS GRUB PA  
MED CE NA, ZHES PA'I PHYOGS SNGA MA RANG LUGS SU KHAS LEN  
RIGS PA'I PHYIR TE,

Are you saying, moreover, that it is proper to throw away the whole system of  
those Lords of Reasoning, the Father and his spiritual Sons, and go  
following the system of that non-Buddhist school, the Rejectionists  
(Lokayata)?

Because you would have to accept the other side as our side in the following verses:

"An Infallible One would have to know  
Even things that are hidden, and there's  
No proof that shows he can;  
Neither is there a way to try."  
Thus do a number of them  
Make their presentation.

And—

Because the mind is something  
That depends upon the body,  
There is nothing you can achieve  
Through practice [over many lifetimes].

SKYE BA SNGA PHYI DU MAR TSOGS GNYIS GOMS PA'I SANGS RGYAS  
'PHAGS PA MI SRID PAR KHAS LEN RIGS PA'I PHYIR TE, SKYE BA SNGA  
PHYI MED PA'I PHYIR TE, SKYE BA MED PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS KHAS,

And this is true because it would then be right for you to accept the position that  
it's impossible for there to exist an enlightened realized being who has practiced  
assembling the two collections over a great many births, past and future.

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`YANG KHO NA RE, SKYE KHA MA'I DNGOS PO YOD PAR THAL, MA'I  
MNGAL NAS SKYE KHA MA'I DNGOS PO YOD PA'I PHYIR ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes again and claims,

There must too exist a working thing which is about to begin,  
Because there exists a working thing which is about to take birth  
from their mother's womb.

SKYE BZHIN PA'I DNGOS PO YOD PAR THAL, MA'I MNGAL NAS SKYE  
BZHIN PA'I DNGOS PO YOD PA'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA

So does there exist then a working thing which is in the act of beginning?  
Because there exists a working which is about to take birth from their mother's  
womb.

The fact that it follows is something you find acceptable.

'GRIG'DOD MI NUS TE, DPAL LDAN ZLA BAS, SKYE BZHIN PA NI SKYE LA  
PHYOGS PAS YOD MIN ZHING , , ZHES GSUNGS PA'I PHYIR,

But you cannot agree, because the glorious Chandrakirti has stated, "Since  
something in the act of beginning is only approaching beginning, it is not  
something which exists."

GZHAN YANG , MA SKYES PA'I DNGOS PO YOD PAR THAL, MA'I MNGAL  
NAS MA SKYES PA'I DNGOS PO YOD PA'I PHYIR,

And are you, furthermore, saying that there exists a working thing which hasn't  
begun?

Because there exists a working thing which hasn't begun, from their mother's  
womb.

KHA CIG, RTAGS MA GRUB ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and says, "It's incorrect [to say that there exists a  
working thing which hasn't begun, from their mother's womb].

RTAGS GRUB STE, MA'I MNGAL DU GNAS BZHIN PA'I SKYES BU YOD PA  
GANG ZHIG, RDZUS SKYES KYI DNGOS PO YANG YOD PA'I PHYIR,

But it is correct, because (1) there does exist a person who is in the act of staying  
in their mother's womb, and (2) there also exists a working thing which is born  
complete.

YANG , SKYES ZIN GYI DNGOS PO SLAR YANG SKYE BA YOD PAR THAL,  
SKYES ZIN GYI SEMS CAN, SLAR YANG SKYE BA YOD PA'I PHYIR TE,  
SKYES ZIN GYI SEMS CAN SLAR YANG 'KHOR BAR SKYE BA YOD PA'I  
PHYIR TE, 'KHOR BAR SKYES ZIN GYI SEMS CAN SLAR YANG 'KHOR BAR  
SKYE BA YOD PA'I PHYIR TE, MIR SKYES ZIN GYI SEMS CAN SLAR YANG  
MIR SKYE BA YOD PA GANG ZHIG, 'DOD PAR SKYES ZIN GYI SEMS CAN  
SLAR YANG 'DOD PAR SKYE BA YOD PA'I PHYIR,

Are you saying, moreover, that a working thing which has already begun begins again?

Because there exists a living being who has already taken birth, and who has to take birth again.

And this is true because there exists a living being who has already taken birth, and who has to take birth again in the circle of suffering life.

And this is true because (1) there exists a living being who has already taken birth as a human, and who has to take birth again as a human; and (2) there exists a living being who has already taken birth into the desire realm, and who has to take birth into the desire realm again.

RTAGS RE RE NAS GRUB STE, MI NAS MIR SKYE BA DANG , 'DOD PA NAS 'DOD PAR SKYE BA YOD PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS SLA'O,

Each of the reasons given is correct, because there do exist those who come from a birth as a human and are born as a human; and there do exist those who come from a birth in the desire realm and are born into the desire realm. It's easy to accept these reasons.

GZHAN YANG , 'BYUNG BA MED PAR THAL, DNGOS PO YIN NA, 'BYUNG BA MA YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR TE, DNGOS PO YIN NA, BYUNG ZIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR, KHYAB PA 'GRIGS,

And is it, moreover, the case that there exists nothing which is occurring?

Because nothing which is a working thing could ever be something which is occurring.

And this is because anything which is a working thing is something which has already occurred. The fact that it follows is something you find acceptable.

RTAGS GRUB STE, DNGOS PO YIN NA, RANG RGYU LAS BYUNG ZIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR TE, DE YIN NA, RANG RGYU LAS SKYES ZIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

The reason we've stated is correct, because anything which is a working thing is something which has already occurred from its own causes.

And this is true because anything which is a working thing is something which has already begun from its own causes.

RTZA BAR 'DOD NA, 'BYUNG BA YOD PAR THAL, 'BYUNG BA BZHI YOD

PA'I PHYIR TE, 'BYUNG BA CHEN PO BZHI YOD PA'I PHYIR TE, SA CHU ME  
RLUNG BZHI YOD PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree to your original statement: it is the case that there  
exists nothing which is occurring.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

There does too exist something which is occurring,  
Because there exist the four great elements.  
And this is because there do exist the four of earth, water, fire, and wind.

[Translator's note: This argument depends upon the fact that the Tibetan words for  
"occurring" and for "element" have the same spelling ('byung ba).]

KHYAB STE, DE BZHI LA, 'BYUNG BA CHEN PO BZHIR MKHAS MCHOG  
DBYIG GNYEN GYIS GSUNGS PA'I PHYIR TE, MDZOD LAS, 'BYUNG BA  
DAG NI SA KHAMS DANG , , CHU DANG ME DANG RLUNG KHAMS  
RNAMS, , ZHES GSUNGS PA'I PHYIR,

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow, because that highest master, Vasubandhu, has stated  
that the great elements are four.  
And this is true because the *Treasure House* says,

The elements are the following:  
The divisions of elements we call  
Earth and water and fire and wind.

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'YANG KHO NA RE, SKYE DGOS KYI DNGOS PO YOD PAR THAL, SKYE  
'GYUR GYI DNGOS PO YOD PA'I PHYIR TE, 'BYUNG 'GYUR GYI DNGOS PO  
YOD PA'I PHYIR ZER NA,

Suppose yet another person comes and claims:

There must too exist a working thing which still has to start,

Because there does exist a working thing which is going to start.  
And this is because there does exist a working thing which is going  
to occur.

MA KHYAB, RTAGS GRUB STE, SNGO SER DKAR DMAR BZHI SOGS  
'BYUNG 'GYUR YIN PA'I PHYIR DANG , 'BYUNG 'GYUR GYI REG BYA YOD  
PA'I PHYIR TE, REG BYA LA 'BYUNG BA DANG 'BYUNG 'GYUR GNYIS YOD  
PA'I PHYIR,

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

The reason in itself though does apply to the subject,  
Because the four of blue, yellow, white, and red and the like are all derivatives of  
the elements, and there also exist tangible objects which are derivatives of  
the elements.  
And this is true because all tangible objects can be divided into two types: those  
that are elements, and those that are derivatives of the elements.

[Translator's note: This argument depends on the fact that the Tibetan for "going to  
occur" and for "derivative of the elements" is the same ('byung-'gyur).]

MDZOD LAS, REG BYA RNAM PA GNYIS YIN TE, , ZHES GSUNGS PA'I  
PHYIR,

And this is true because *The Treasure House of Wisdom* says,

Tangible objects are of two types...

RTZA BAR 'DOD MI NUS TE, DNGOS PO YIN NA, SKYES ZIN PAS KHYAB  
PA'I PHYIR,

You can't though agree to the original statement, [that there must exist a working  
thing which still has to start],  
Because anything which is a working thing is something which must have  
already started.

DE LA KHO NA RE, 'BYUNG 'GYUR GYI DNGOS PO MED PAR THAL,  
DNGOS PO YIN NA, BYUNG ZIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR, ZHES KHA CIG  
ZER BA NI,

On this point some may make the following claim:

It must so be the case that there exists no working thing which is going to occur,  
Because anything which is a working thing must have already occurred.

LEGS PAR MA BRTAGS PAS NONGS PA YIN TE, SKYE 'GYUR DANG SKYE DGOS ZHES PA SLAR SKYE 'GYUR DANG , SLAR SKYE DGOS KHO NA LA BYED PAR MTSUNGS KYANG ,

This position though reflects a gross error of failing to examine things thoroughly. The expressions "going to start" and "still needs to start" are equivalent in meaning, exclusively, "going to start from the beginning" and "still needs to start from the beginning."

'BYUNG DGOS ZHES PA SLAR 'BYUNG DGOS PA KHO NA DANG , 'BYUNG 'GYUR ZHES PA DA LTAR BYUNG ZIN SNGON PO DANG , TSA BA DANG , GRANG BA'I REG BYA SOGS LA'ANG 'JUG PA'I BRDA 'CHAD MDZAD PA MA THOS PAS NONGS PA'I PHYIR,

But whereas "still needs to occur" means, exclusively, "still needs to occur from the beginning," the [Tibetan phrase for] "going to occur" also applies to things which have already occurred, such as the color blue, or the tangible objects of heat or cold, and so on. And the mistake by the opponent here is that they have never heard the terms explained this way.

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'KHA CIG, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYES LA 'GAGS PA BUM PA'I DUS SU 'DAS PA'I MTSAN NYID, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYE BA'I RGYU YOD KYANG MA SKYES PA, BUM PA'I DUS SU MA 'ONGS PA'I MTSAN NYID, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYES LA MA 'GAGS PA BUM PA'I DUS SU DA LTAR BA'I MTSAN NYID ZER NA,

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

The definition of something "past" relative to the time of a water pitcher is "that which has started and also stopped, in the time that

the water pitcher is present."

The definition of something "future" relative to the time of a water pitcher is "that which is such that—although the causes for it to start are already present--it has yet to start, in the time that the water pitcher is present."

The definition of something "present" relative to the time of a water pitcher is "that which has started and not yet stopped, in the time that the water pitcher is present."

DANG PO LA, BUM PA'I RGYU CHOS CAN, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYES LA  
'GAGS PA YIN PAR THAL, DE'I DUS SU 'DAS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, CHOS  
CAN DE'I PHYIR,

Let us address the first of these definitions.

Consider the cause of a water pitcher.

Is this cause then something which has started and also stopped, in the time that the water pitcher is present?

Because it is something which is past relative to the time of the water pitcher.

And this is because it is the example we've chosen here.

SNGON MAR 'DOD NA, BUM PA'I RGYU CHOS CAN, BUM PA'I DUS SU  
SKYES PA YANG YIN, 'GAGS PA YANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN PA YIN PAR  
THAL, 'DOD PA'I PHYIR,

And suppose you agree to the previous statement. [That is, suppose you agree that the cause of a water pitcher is something which has started and also stopped in the time of the water pitcher.]

Consider again the cause of a water pitcher.

Is it then one thing which has both (1) started in the time of the water pitcher and (2) stopped in the time of the water pitcher?

[Why do you say that?]

Because you agreed.

'DOD NA, DE CHOS CAN, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYES PA YIN PAR THAL,

'DOD PA'I PHYIR,

[Then I agree that the cause of a water pitcher is one thing which has both (1) started in the time of the water pitcher and (2) stopped in the time of the water pitcher.]

Suppose you agree then.

Consider this same thing.

Is it then something which has started in the time of the water pitcher?

[Why do you say that?]

Because you agreed above.

'DOD MI NUS TE, BUM PA'I DUS SU MA SKYES PA YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, DE'I DUS SU MA BYAS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

And yet you can't agree, because it is something which has not started in the time of the water pitcher.

And this is because it is something which has not been made in the time of the water pitcher.

MA KHYAB NA, KHYAB STE, DE'I DUS SU MA SKYES PA DE, DE'I DUS SU MA BYAS PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, DE'I DUS SU MA BYAS PA YOD PA GANG ZHIG, MA SKYES PA MA BYAS PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, SKYES PA BYAS PA'I MTSAN NYID YIN PA'I PHYIR,

[It's not necessarily the case that, because the cause of a pitcher is something which has not been made in the time of the water pitcher, it must be something which has not started in the time of the water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not necessarily the case.

It is though necessarily the case,

Because the very definition of something's not having been made in a certain time is "something's not having started" in that same time.

And this is true because (1) there is at that time something which hasn't been made, and (2) the definition of "something that hasn't been made" is

"something that hasn't started."

And this is true because "something that has started" is the definition of "something that has been made."

MA KHYAB 'TSAMS LA MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DE'I DUS SU MA BYAS PAR THAL, DE'I DUS SU MED PA'I PHYIR TE, DE'I DUS SU 'GAGS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, DE'I DUS SU SKYES LA 'GAGS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS KHAS,

Now suppose that you were to answer "it's not correct to say that" above, where you answered "it doesn't necessarily follow." [That is, suppose you say that it's not correct to say that the cause of a water pitcher is something which has not been made in the time of the water pitcher.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so true that it has not been made in that particular time,

Because it doesn't even exist in that particular time.

And this is because it has stopped in that particular time.

And this is because, in that particular time, it has started and also stopped.

And you've already agreed to what we stated as our reason.

GZHAN YANG , BUM PA'I RGYU CHOS CAN, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYES PA YANG YIN, 'GAGS PA YANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN PA MA YIN PAR THAL, 'GAGS PA MA YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, MA 'GAGS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, 'DUS BYAS YIN PA'I PHYIR,

Consider, moreover, the cause of a water pitcher, once again.

It is not so, that it is one thing which has both (1) started in the time of the water pitcher, and (2) stopped in this same time,

Because it is not something which has stopped.

And this is true because it hasn't stopped.

And this is true because it is a produced thing.

---

'YANG KHO NA RE, BUM PA'I RGYU CHOS CAN, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYES PA YIN PAR THAL, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYES ZIN PA'I PHYIR NA, MA KHYAB,

Suppose yet another person comes, and makes this claim:

Consider the cause of a water pitcher.

It is too something which has started in the time of the water pitcher,

Because it has finished starting in the time of the water pitcher.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

DES NA, BUM PA'I RGYU DE, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYES KYANG , DE'I DUS SU SKYES PA MA YIN ZER DGOS TE, DPER NA, RANG RGYUD PA SOGS KYIS, LAS 'BRAS BDEN YANG DE BDEN PA MA YIN, ZHES BZHED PA DANG KHAS LEN 'DZIN PHYOGS MTSUNGS SO, ,

Therefore we have to express the situation as follows: Although the cause of the water pitcher, in the time of the water pitcher, has already begun, it is not something which has begun in the time of the water pitcher. This is for example like the case where the followers of the Independent group of the Middle-Way School and such say that "Cause and effect is true [Tib: *bden-pa*], but not real [Tib: *bden-pa*]." You have to be able to make the same kind of distinction here.

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'KHA CIG, RNAM MKHYEN GYIS BUM PA MNGON SUM DU RTOGS KYANG , MNGON RJES GNYIS KYI ZLAS PHYE BA'I MNGON SUM DU MA RTOGS ZER, DE NI SHIN TU 'THAD MOD,

Suppose someone comes along and claims,

Even though omniscience perceives a water pitcher directly, it does not do so in the sense that the word "directly" has when we divide perception into the two of "direct" and "deductive."

To this we answer, "You are absolutely correct."

'ON KYANG , MNGON SUM YIN NA, MNGON RJES GNYIS KYI ZLAS PHYE BA'I MNGON GSUM YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR NA, RTZOD PA'I TSE RIGS PA GRUB DGOS SO, ,

If however someone were to come along in a debate and say that "Every state of direct perception is 'direct' in the sense that this word has when we divide perception into the two of 'direct' and 'deductive'," some logic would be required to prove the point just made.

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MTSAN NYID GNYIS PA LA, BUM PA'I 'BRAS BU CHOS CAN, MA SKYES PAR THAL, MA SKYES PA'I CHA YIN PA'I PHYIR TE, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYE BA'I RGYU YOD KYANG , MA SKYES PA'I CHA YIN PA'I PHYIR,

As for the second definition, [the definition of "the future" given above,] consider the result of a water pitcher.

Is it then something that has not begun?

Because it is the condition of not having begun.

And this is because it is the condition of not having begun, even though the causes for its beginning exist in the time of the water pitcher.

`KHA CIG, MA KHYAB ZER YANG BSDUS GRVA MA CHAGS PA'I RTAGS SO,,

Now some may come along and claim, in response, that "it doesn't necessarily follow." This however would indicate that they had yet to grasp the meaning of the collected topics on logic and perception.

MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYE BA'I RGYU YOD KYANG MA SKYES PA'I CHA YIN PAR THAL, DE'I DUS SU MA 'ONGS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR, RTAGS SLA, KHYAB PA KHAS,

Suppose someone else came and said, instead, that "Your reason is not correct."

Consider then this same thing: [the result of a water pitcher].

Are you saying that it is the condition of not having begun, even though, in the time of the pitcher, the causes for its beginning are present?

Because it is "the future" at this same time.

The correctness of our reason is easy to accept.

And you've already accepted the necessity.

MTSAN NYID GSUM PA LA, KHA CIG, BUM PA'I RGYU CHOS CAN, BUM PA'I DUS SU DA LTAR BA YIN PAR THAL, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYES LA MA 'GAGS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR, DER THAL, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYES PA GANG ZHIG, MA 'GAGS PA YIN PA'I PHYIR ZER NA,

As for the third of the definitions above, [that of "the present,"] suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider the cause of a water pitcher.

It is so something which is present-time in the time of the water pitcher,

Because it is something which, in the time of the water pitcher, has begun and not yet stopped.

It is so, because it is both (1) something which has begun in the time of the water pitcher and (2) something which has not stopped in that time.

RANG RES RTAGS DANG PO MA GRUB BYAS PAR, DE CHOS CAN, DE'I DUS SU SKYES PA YIN PAR THAL, DE'I DUS SU SKYES ZIN PA'I PHYIR NA, MA KHYAB,

Our side would answer that the first part of this reason is not correct.

And then the other side would come back with,

Consider then this same thing.

It is too something which has begun in the time of the water pitcher,

Because it is something which has finished beginning in that time.

To this we'd answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

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, 'DAS MA 'ONGS YOD MED LA DPYAD PA NI, SPYIR 'DAS PA DANG MA 'ONGS PA'I MTSAN NYID MED DE, 'DAS PA DANG MA 'ONGS PA MED PA'I PHYIR TE, GZHI GRUB NA, DA LTAR BA YIN PAS KHYAB PA'I PHYIR,

Here next is an analysis of the question of whether the past and the future exist

or not. Generally speaking there exist no definitions for "the past" or "the future," because the past and future are not things which even exist. This is because, anything which can be established as existing must always be existing in the present [according to this school of Buddhism].

GZHI LA LTOS NAS 'JOG NA, BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYES ZIN PA YANG YIN,  
BUM PA'I DUS SU DGAGS ZIN PA YANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN PA, BUM  
PA'I DUS SU 'DAS PA'I MTSAN NYID, DE DANG BUM PA'I SNGA LOGS SU  
BYUNG BA DON

If though we were to establish the meaning of "the past" relative to a specific point of reference, we could say that the definition of its past relative to the time of a specific water pitcher could be given as follows:

Something which has, by the time of the water pitcher, already started; and which has, by the time of the water pitcher, already ended as well.

This and "the pitcher just before the pitcher" amount to the same thing.

GCIGBUM PA'I DUS SU GRUB ZIN PA YANG YIN, BUM PA DANG DUS  
MNYAM PA YANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN PAR DMIGS PA, BUM PA'I DUS  
SU DA LTAR BA'I MTSAN NYID,

The definition of its present relative to the time of a specific water pitcher then could be given as follows:

That one thing which is both (1) something which has already come into existence by the time of the water pitcher; and (2) which is simultaneous to the water pitcher.

BUM PA'I DUS SU SKYE BZHIN PA YANG YIN, BUM PA'I DUS SU MA SKYES  
PA YANG YIN PA'I GZHI MTHUN PAR DMIGS PA, BUM PA'I DUS SU MA  
'ONGS PA'I MTSAN NYID,

The definition of its future relative to the time of a specific water pitcher, finally, could be given as follows:

That one thing which is both (1) in the act of starting at the time of the water pitcher; and (2) not yet started at the time of the water

pitcher.

BUM PA'I MA 'ONGS PA, BUM PA'I RGYU, BUM PA'I DUS SU 'DAS PA, BUM  
PA LA LTOS TE 'DAS PA RNAMS DON

The following all amount to the same thing:

the not-yet-coming of the water pitcher;  
the cause of the water pitcher;  
its past at the time of the water pitcher;  
and its past relative to the water pitcher.

[Translator's note: "Not-yet-coming" and "future" are the same word in Tibetan (ma-'ongs-pa).]

GCIGBUM PA'I 'DAS PA, BUM PA'I 'BRAS BU, BUM PA'I DUS SU MA 'ONGS  
PA, BUM PA LA LTOS TE MA 'ONGS PA RNAMS DON

The following also all amount to the same thing:

the passing of the water pitcher;  
the result of the water pitcher;  
its future at the time of the water pitcher;  
and its future relative to the water pitcher.

[Translator's note: "Passing" and "past" are the same word in Tibetan ('das-pa).]

CIGSPYIR 'GAGS PA MED, ZHIG PA MED, SKYE KHA MA MED, SKYE  
BZHIN PA MED, SKYE BA LA MNGON DU PHYOGS PA MED,

Generally speaking, there is no such thing as something which has stopped. And there is nothing which is about to begin. Neither is there anything which is in the act of beginning, nor is there anything which is approaching the state of beginning.

DU BA 'DAS PA YOD, DU BA 'GAGS PA YOD, DU BA MA 'ONGS PA YOD,  
DU BA SKYE KHA MA YOD, DU BA SKYE BZHIN PA YOD, DU BA SKYE BA  
LA MNGON DU PHYOGS PA YOD,

There does exist though the passing of the smoke; and the stopping of the smoke;

and the smoke's not yet coming, and the smoke's being about to begin; and the smoke's being in the act of beginning; and the smoke's approaching the state of beginning.

SKYE BA LA MNGON DU PHYOGS PA'I DU BA MED, SKYE BZHIN PA'I DU BA MED, SKYE KHA MA'I DU BA MED, 'GAGS PA'I DU BA MED, ZHIG PA'I DU BA MED, 'DAS PA'I DU BA MED, MA 'ONGS PA'I DU BA MED,

There is though no such thing as smoke which is approaching the state of beginning. Neither is there any smoke which is in the act of beginning; nor any smoke which is about to begin; nor smoke which has stopped; nor smoke which has been destroyed; nor smoke which is past; nor smoke which is future.

DNGOS PO, MI RTAG PA, SKAD CIG MA, 'JIGS BZHIN PA, 'GAGS BZHIN PA, 'DAS PA LA MNGON DU PHYOGS PA, ZHIG PA LA MNGON DU PHYOGS PA RNAMS DON

The following all amount to the same thing:

- a working thing;
- a changing thing;
- a momentary thing;
- a thing which is in the act of being destroyed;
- a thing which is approaching the past;
- a thing which is approaching its destruction.

GCIGDM BCA' 'DI DAG NI, RIGS PA'I RJES 'BRANG GI MDO SDE PA'I DBANG DU BYAS SO, , GZHAN LA NI MA NGES TE, BYE BRAG SMRA BAS, 'DAS PA'I LAS DANG , MA 'ONGS PA'I LAS SOGS KHAS LEN CING , THAL 'GYUR BAS, ZHIG PA DNGOS POR BZHED PA SOGS BZHED TSUL BSAM GYIS MI KHYAB PA YOD PA'I PHYIR, ,

These assertions [about the nature of time] are all presented in accordance with the beliefs of the "Logician" group within the Sutrists School. They would not necessarily be acceptable to any other school of Buddhism. The Detailists, for example, do accept ideas such as past karma and future karma, while the Necessity group entertains unimaginably profound positions such as the one that states that the destruction of something is a working thing.